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Comparative corporate governance has focused either on prevailing 
differences across legal systems or on spontaneous legal transplants of 
foreign institutions in response to global competition. This Essay argues 
that corporate law today is not only a product of the invisible hand of the 
market but also of the soft (and not-so-soft) hands of international 
organizations and standard setters. By tracing the emergence of 
international corporate law (ICL) since the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, it 
shows how the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank, and the United Nations, 
among several other international players, have helped shape legal reforms 
and corporate governance developments around the world. The observed 
influence of ICL ranges from the impulse for independent directors and the 
control of related-party transactions to the growth of ESG investment 
factors and human rights policies.  
The rise of ICL responds to interjurisdictional externalities and 
nationalist bias of domestic regimes that have been largely neglected by 
prevailing theories, which failed to predict and notice the strong push for 
international coordination and standard setting in the field. ICL has also 
gone beyond merely prescribing an Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance to promote legal innovations that place the United States on the 
receiving end of international pressure. Legal implants from ICL, rather 
than legal transplants from a foreign jurisdiction, are an increasingly 
relevant force behind corporate governance change. While ICL has been 
influential, its efficacy and normative vision face challenges. The time has 
come to move beyond an exclusively comparative focus to also scrutinize 
the potential and limits of corporate lawmaking at the international level.  
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INTRODUCTION 
What do the emergence of independent directors in South Korea, the 
legal reforms on related-party transactions in India, and the rise of 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors in the United States 
have in common? They all trace back to efforts by international 
organizations—the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the 
United Nations, respectively—to shape corporate governance arrangements 
around the world. The different corporate guidelines and norms produced 
by international organizations have had a noticeable impact on legal 












corporate governance (CCG) has failed to notice and reflect on the creeping 
rise of what I term international corporate law (ICL).1 
Corporate law is one of the main fields of comparative legal inquiry.2 In 
sharp contrast to the norm in other areas, many, if not most, prominent 
corporate law scholars in the United States and beyond have contributed to 
comparative corporate governance.3 Politicians also habitually appeal to 
foreign legal systems when advancing domestic corporate law reforms, as 
illustrated by the reference to German law in the US bill aiming to mandate 
employee representation on corporate boards.4  
While the influence of foreign legal transplants on the evolution of 
domestic corporate law regimes is longstanding and well known, by the late 
1990s a central debate emerged about the possible effects of economic 
globalization on national corporate arrangements. The “convergence” camp 
posited that the competitive pressures of global markets would push 
jurisdictions around the world to converge in the adoption of efficient 
systems of shareholder protection. 5  The opposing “persistence” camp 
 
1. “Transnational corporate law,” “global corporate law,” and “transnational legal orders in 
corporate law” are alternative labels for the phenomenon. The widely used term transnational law is too 
broad, encompassing not only laws that originate in international law or originate domestically and are 
spread through international law, but also “law that is borrowed or ‘horizontally transplanted’ from one 
national system to another.” Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 745, 745–46 (2006). I adopt international corporate law to underscore the novel dimension of 
interjurisdictional coordination, since the borrowing of legal ideas across jurisdictions and the cross-
fertilization of corporate law and governance systems are longstanding and well known. For the related 
sociolegal conception of transnational legal ordering, see Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal 
Ordering and State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory 
Shaffer ed., 2021). I use the term “comparative corporate governance” as the most common label for the 
field, which also encompasses comparative corporate law.  
2. See, e.g., Edward B. Rock, America’s Shifting Fascination with Comparative Corporate 
Governance, 74 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 367 (1996); Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: 
The State of the Art and International Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1 (2011); Donald C. Clarke, 
“Nothing but Wind”? The Past and Future of Comparative Corporate Governance, 59 AM. J. COMPAR. 
L. 75 (2011).  
3. For just a few illustrative examples, see REINIER KRAAKMAN, JOHN ARMOUR, PAUL DAVIES, 
LUCA ENRIQUES, HENRY HANSMANN, GERARD HERTIG, KLAUS HOPT, HIDEKI KANDA, MARIANA 
PARGENDLER, WOLF-GEORG RINGE & EDWARD ROCK, THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (3d ed., 2017); Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate 
Governance: Convergence of Form or Function, 49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 329 (2001); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 
STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999); CURTIS J. MILHAUPT & KATHARINA PISTOR, LAW AND CAPITALISM: WHAT 
CORPORATE CRISES REVEAL ABOUT LEGAL SYSTEMS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AROUND THE 
WORLD (2008). 
4. For the brief description of the Accountable Capitalism Act, S. 3348, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018), 
introduced by U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren, see Elizabeth Warren, Accountable Capitalism Act, https:/ 
/www.warren.senate.gov/download/accountable-capitalism-act-one-pager [https://perma.cc/QEA5-4DJ 
T] (“Borrowing from the successful approach in Germany and other developed economies, a United 
States corporation must ensure that no fewer than 40% of its directors are selected by the corporation’s 
employees.”). 
5. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).  











argued that distinct ownership and political structures would ensure the 
persistence of national differences despite the pressures of globalization.6 
Both camps relied on a model of competition, with states unilaterally 
choosing either to maintain their existing corporate governance framework, 
or to update it toward greater investor protection to improve the position of 
domestic firms in global markets.7 In parallel, at least some jurisdictions 
would also compete in the provision of investor-friendly laws in a global 
market for incorporations.  
The competition paradigm, however, offers an incomplete picture of the 
forces shaping corporate law over the last few decades. Coordination efforts 
by international institutions, rather than unilateral moves prompted by 
competition alone, have played a role in several corporate law developments 
around the world.8 Unbeknownst to most observers, the various guidelines 
and initiatives by international organizations such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), and the United Nations have 
amounted to a sizable body of ICL.9 Beyond international organizations 
proper, transnational institutions and standard-setting bodies such as the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, and the Financial Stability Board have 
also increasingly influenced corporate governance developments.  
Moreover, the emergence of ICL is not only surprising for its 
international origin and coordinated form, but also for its substance. Both 
sides of the convergence-persistence debate shared the assumption that 
concerns about externalities fell outside of corporate law’s domain. Yet ICL 
 
6.Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 3, at 170.  
7. See supra notes 4–5. 
8. Coordination is used loosely to refer to concerted international action aimed at solving both 
prisoner’s dilemmas and coordination games across jurisdictions. For a discussion of the distinction and 
implications of solutions to prisoner’s dilemmas and coordination games in the international arena, see 
generally Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International 
Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923 (1985).  
9. See, e.g., Klaus Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 1172 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (“In view of the 
golden age of the elaboration of common principles of law such as the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law, it is astonishing that 
similarly successful work has not yet been undertaken in the area of company law.”). But see Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2018) (alluding to 
the role of “global governance” through supranational public institutions in prompting convergence, 
mentioning the channels of the World Bank, the OECD, and the G-20/Financial Stability Board); 
Dionysia Katelouzou & Peer Zumbansen, The Transnationalization of Corporate Governance: Law, 
Institutional Arrangements & Corporate Power 6 (Transnat’l L. Inst., Working Paper No. 17, 2020) 
(arguing against “treating transnational law as the ‘exception’”); Dionysia Katelouzou & Peer 
Zumbansen, The New Geographies of Corporate Governance, 42 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 51, 54 (2020) 
(advocating for a broader conception of corporate governance as a “transnational field of . . . norm-












has sought not only to enhance investor protection (the result predicted by 
convergence proponents), but also to address various externalities generated 
by corporate activity, such as systemic risk, environmental harm, and 
human rights violations (an outcome that was not foreseen).  
ICL has not been merely a vehicle for the diffusion of Anglo-Saxon 
practices, but has become increasingly a source of institutional innovation, 
including in directions resisted by the United States. Despite strong 
networks and points of contact, ICL is far from monolithic. Not only are the 
avenues for influence of ICL on domestic law varied, but there is also some 
tension between the pro-investor focus promoted by some organizations and 
the concern for stakeholders fostered by others. 
The IMF imposed various corporate law reforms on South Korea, 
including the requirement of independent directors, as a condition for 
financial support at the height of the Asian crisis in the late 1990s.10 In the 
mid-2010s, India reformed its corporate laws to improve its relative ranking 
in the World Bank’s Doing Business Project, a mechanism of “governance 
by indicators” that arguably serves both to lure foreign investment and to 
obtain World Bank funding.11 By the late 2010s, the corporate governance 
debate around the world had placed great emphasis on ESG factors—a 
concept first coined and dutifully promoted by various United Nations 
initiatives.12 More generally, jurisdictional competition for corporate law 
may become increasingly bounded by international lawmaking.13 
This Essay aims to describe and explain the rise of ICL since the late 
1990s in the face of the dominant view that coordinated efforts at 
harmonization are unnecessary, if not counterproductive. Why, then, do we 
see ICL at all? While this complex phenomenon is certainly multifaceted 
and not monocausal, this Essay interprets the emergence of ICL as a 
solution to two critical problems within corporate law:  
Interjurisdictional externalities. Corporate activity can have negative 
effects on third parties, such as producing systemic risk, environmental 
harm, and human rights violations. In the orthodox law and economics view, 
these externalities should be addressed through regulations from legal fields 
other than corporate law, such as financial regulation, environmental law, 
labor law, and tort law, among others.14 However, states may be reluctant to 
 
10. See infra Part II.A. 
11. GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH QUANTIFICATION AND 
RANKINGS (Kevin E. Davis, Angelina Fisher, Benedict Kingsbury & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2012). 
12. See infra Part II.D. 
13. For the argument that Delaware lawmaking is bounded by US federal law, see Mark J. Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 590 (2003). 
14. Mariana Pargendler, Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century: Complicating 
Corporate Governance Beyond Agency Costs, 45 J. CORP. L. 953, 969 (2020) [hereinafter Pargendler, 
 











impose regulations on local companies if—as is often the case—the 
negative effects are largely felt abroad, as this could impact their 
international competitiveness. Moreover, dedicated regulation from other 
fields is famously absent in the international arena, thus leading to major 
regulatory gaps which ICL may seek to fill.15 ICL could thus help solve a 
prisoner’s dilemma arising from states’ temptation to engage in beggar-thy-
neighbor policies. Another form of interjurisdictional externality relates to 
the potential network benefits of standardization in corporate governance 
practices and disclosure standards in reducing transaction costs in cross-
border transactions.16  
Political capture by domestic interest groups. Even when the promotion 
of shareholder protection or the mitigation of externalities are welfare 
enhancing within a given country, reforms may still not materialize due to 
the political clout of powerful interest groups, such as controlling 
shareholders, managers, or labor unions. Moreover, states famously face a 
problem of time-inconsistency in the protection of foreign investors, 
initially seeking to attract investors only to renege on early promises once 
foreigners’ investment is sunk.17 In this context, international law initiatives 
may weaken the political force of domestic interest groups in defending 
rent-seeking measures and promote credible commitments to investor 
protection and other areas of concern for foreign parties.  
These problems relate to the phenomenon I have termed “the grip of 
nationalism on corporate law,” which is the pervasive use of corporate law 
to achieve protectionist purposes at the expense of foreign parties. 18 
 
Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century] (describing the standard “modular” approach to 
corporate law, according to which the sole efficiency objective of the field is the reduction of agency 
costs).  
15. On the regulatory gaps of globalization as a motivation for ICL, see infra Part II.D. On the 
broader uses of corporate governance in substituting for state regulation, see Mariana Pargendler, The 
Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359 (2016).  
16. For the role of network effects in corporate law, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, 
Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757 (1995). The current debate about 
comparability of ESG disclosure frameworks and the virtues of a single global reporting framework 
illustrates this concern. See John Coates (Acting Director, SEC Division of Corporate Finance), ESG 
Disclosure – Keeping Pace with Developments Affecting Investors, Public Companies and the Capital 
Markets, Mar. 11, 2021, https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/coates-esg-disclosure-keeping-pac 
e-031121 [https://perma.cc/F7EP-PJDL] (“It would be unhelpful for multiple standards to apply to the 
same risks faced by the same companies that happen to raise capital or operate in multiple markets.”).  
17. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. 
ENTERPRISES 46–47 (1971) (describing foreign direct investment as an “obsolescing bargain”). On the 
government incentives to expropriate foreigners’ sunk investment, see David W. Leebron, A Game 
Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305, 313, 325 (1991). 
18. Mariana Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law, 95 IND. L.J. 533 (2020) 
[hereinafter Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism]. However, certain nationalist uses of corporate law 
may well enhance global welfare (if, for instance, they help the development of nascent industries in 












Conventional theories have traditionally neglected interjurisdictional 
externalities as a justification for corporate law harmonization. Although 
scholars have long documented the influence of politics on corporate 
governance, 19  the potential of international coordination to mitigate 
domestic capture has not been explored in this context, in contrast to other 
fields.20 
The aim here is not to overstate the significance of ICL from a normative 
or descriptive perspective—that is, as a source of law that is necessarily (or 
never) meritorious and fully (or never) efficacious. It seems clear that ICL 
is not always welfare enhancing and has not produced complete formal or 
functional legal convergence in corporate laws around the world. Rather, 
the goal is to document the rise of ICL as a robust and influential 
phenomenon that deserves corresponding attention. While the international 
dimensions of other fields such as bankruptcy law, 21  antitrust law, 22 
anticorruption law,23 administrative law,24 and financial regulation25 are the 
subject of a booming literature, corporate law scholarship has failed to track 
institutional developments in the international arena. Greater understanding 
of the role and impact of ICL, as well as of its welfare effects, is necessary 
to better understand and influence the development of corporate governance 
institutions.  
 
19. For prominent political accounts, see, e.g., PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, 
POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2005); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of 
Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1005 (2005). 
20. For this argument in the context of international trade law, see Giovanni Maggi & Andrés 
Rodríguez-Clare, The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures, 106 J. POL. 
ECON. 574 (1998); Chad P. Brown, The Truth About Trade Agreements—and Why We Need Them, 
PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://piie.com/commentary/op-eds/truth-about-trad 
e-agreements-and-why-we-need-them [https://perma.cc/38UV-F8VH].  
21. See, e.g., John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in International Bankruptcy: The Problems of 
and Proposed Solutions to “Local Interests”, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1899 (2006); Terence C. Halliday & 
Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the 
Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 1135 (2007).  
22. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1501 
(1998); Eleanor M. Fox, International Antitrust and the Doha Dome, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 911 (2003); Anu 
Bradford, Antitrust Law in Global Markets, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
ANTITRUST LAW (Einer Elhauge ed., 2012).  
23. See, e.g., Rachel Brewster & Christine Dryden, Building Multilateral Anticorruption 
Enforcement: Analogies Between International Trade & Anti-Bribery Law, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 221 
(2018); KEVIN E. DAVIS, BETWEEN IMPUNITY AND IMPERIALISM: THE REGULATION OF 
TRANSNATIONAL BRIBERY (2019). 
24. See, e.g., Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005). 
25. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE 
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2012); David Zaring, Financial Reform’s Internationalism, 65 EMORY 
L.J. 1255 (2016); JOHN ARMOUR, DAN AWREY, PAUL DAVIES, LUCA ENRIQUES, JEFFREY N. GORDON, 
COLIN MAYER & JENNIFER PAYNE, PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016) (devoting chapter 
28 to international regulatory coordination).  











The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I begins by 
defining ICL. Part II describes the rise of ICL since the 1990s by mapping 
key initiatives of several international organizations and illustrating their 
influence on domestic laws and governance practices. Part III documents 
the growing diffusion of ICL through standard setters and international 
agreements. Part IV reflects on the limits of ICL. The Conclusion concludes 
by outlining a research agenda for the field.  
I. DEFINING ICL 
This section clarifies what one means by “international corporate law” 
by focusing on four questions: (1) is ICL international law?; (2) is ICL 
corporate law?; (3) how does ICL differ from CCG?; and (4) how does ICL 
relate to the large field of EU corporate law? 
A. ICL as International Law 
The prevailing scholarly assumption among enthusiasts and critics alike 
is that corporate globalization is governed entirely by rules of private 
international law (or conflict of laws, in Anglo-Saxon parlance). Once states 
began to increasingly recognize the place of incorporation as the relevant 
conflict rule for the application of choice of law, a market for corporate laws 
would emerge leading to regulatory competition. As a result, a few 
jurisdictions, such as Delaware, London, and the Cayman Islands, would be 
in a position to provide efficient corporate laws for a significant fraction of 
global corporations under the auspices of global (mostly Anglo-Saxon) law 
firms.26 While compelling, this narrative unduly neglects the role of ICL in 
producing coordinated standard setting in the field, with significant support 
not only from states but also from multinational corporations, institutional 
investors, and the elite global law firms who serve them.  
As here defined, ICL is the body of corporate governance rules and 
standards produced by international organizations, standard setters, and 
international agreements. Clearly, ICL does not look like domestic 
corporate law in its form, structure, and operation. Not only does ICL (like 
all forms of international law) escape coercive enforcement, but it has also 
largely eschewed the traditional modes of “hard” international law in the 
form of treaties or customary international law. Instead, ICL relies primarily 
 
26. KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND 
INEQUALITY 9 (2019) (arguing that the “decentered nature of law” means that “global commerce and 












on soft, decentralized, and highly networked forms of international 
coordination and standard setting that characterize “the new world order.”27  
Not all ICL is soft, however. Corporate governance provisions are now 
making an appearance in international investment agreements—a classic 
form of “hard” international law.28 Moreover, not all soft law is truly soft in 
its impact, with the distinction between hard and soft law best described as 
a continuum rather than a strict dichotomy. 29  Corporate governance 
conditionalities of IMF financing may seem highly coercive to countries in 
crisis. Efforts such as the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings appear to 
rely on potential Bank funding and reputation benefits in international 
markets. Even US regulators, the most powerful in the world, now often 
decry international regulatory pressure as “coercive.” 30  International 
organizations and standard setters have also increasingly operated as 
relevant “intellectual actors” in the field.31  
The claim here is that the various mechanisms of ICL are sufficiently 
institutionalized and robust to be qualified as law, if usually soft law. To put 
it differently, ICL appears to be “legal” as much as international financial 
regulation is “regulatory.”32 It is worth noting that even state corporate law 
is softer than usually recognized, often operating through its impact on 
social norms.33 At any rate, even if one does not deem ICL to be law, this 
would not affect the argument about its role in shaping corporate 
governance developments.  
B. ICL as Corporate Law 
Even if ICL is international law, is it truly corporate law? The answer 
here appears to be undoubtedly positive. The stuff of ICL—standards on 
board independence, shareholder rights, related-party transactions, 
executive compensation, and fiduciary duties—constitutes the bread and 
 
27. ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 24–25 (2004); Kenneth W. Abbott & 
Duncan Snidal, Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: 
Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501 (2009). 
28. See infra Part III.  
29. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421 (2000) (describing different gradations of soft law as weakening the dimensions of 
obligation, precision, and delegation that characterize hard law).  
30. See infra note 252 and accompanying text.  
31. André Broome & Leonard Seabrooke, Seeing like an International Organisation, 17 NEW 
POL. ECON. 1, 13 (2012). 
32. BRUMMER, supra note 25, at 4 (ascribing the early neglect of international financial 
regulation to “an incomplete understanding of soft law—both of its impact on financial markets and of 
the unique institutional ecosystem in which it operates”).  
33. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA 
L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997) (arguing that Delaware law influences managers’ behaviors through social 
norms articulated as “corporate law sermons,” which are often not accompanied by hard sanctions). 











butter of corporate law scholarship and practice. Although topics such as 
the consideration of ESG factors in investment decisions or the 
corporation’s responsibility to protect human rights appear to be a closer 
call, they can still be understood as affecting the exercise of corporate 
discretion and fiduciary duties. Cognizant of this point, ICL lawmakers have 
often sought legal opinions from international law firms on the 
compatibility of their proposed measures with national corporate and 
fiduciary laws.34  
An alternative approach would be to define corporate law not in terms of 
its structure (e.g., rules governing the balance of power among shareholders, 
directors, and officers) but in terms of a stipulated goal: reducing agency 
costs. Adopting this narrower definition would mean that World Bank 
initiatives to promote investor protection would qualify as corporate law, 
but Basel corporate governance rules aimed at reducing systemic risk would 
not. Such a purpose-based definition of the field would not eliminate the 
significance of ICL, but only restrict its scope. Nevertheless, the notion that 
corporate law has only one objective, although prevalent in law-and-
economics scholarship, fails to reflect the actual operation of legal 
institutions, and is ultimately untenable.35 At any rate, one common move 
within ICL is to reconceptualize ESG and systemic risk issues as 
fundamentally addressing agency problems in a world of long-term and 
diversified investors.36 
C. ICL and CCG: From Legal Transplants to Legal Implants  
Foreign legal models have long influenced the evolution of corporate law 
around the world, from the expansion and liberalization of incorporations in 
the nineteenth century, to the recurrent debates about board structure and 
shareholder power since the late 1970s. The novelty of ICL does not lie in 
the transnational diffusion of legal ideas, which has shaped corporate law 
since its inception, but in the new forms of coordinated and original 
lawmaking at the international level. This new form of outside influence is 
 
34. See infra notes 186, 193, and 195 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the emergence 
of transnational fiduciary law, see Thilo Kuntz, Transnational Fiduciary Law, 5 UC IRVINE J. INT., 
TRANSNAT’L & COMP. L. 47, 50 (2020). 
35. Pargendler, Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 14, at 969–75. 
36. See infra Part III.D. For a reinterpretation of shareholder value in a world of diversified 
shareholders, see John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. 












markedly different from the traditional conception of legal transplants that 
dominate comparative scholarship generally and CCG in particular.37 
The notion of a legal transplant explicitly builds on the metaphor of a 
plant that is transplanted to different soil or of an organ that is transplanted 
to a different patient. The Oxford English Dictionary defines the verb 
transplant as to “move or transfer (someone or something) to another place 
or situation.” 38  A legal transfer is then the transfer of law from one 
jurisdiction to another.39 A canonical comparative law question is whether 
the transplant will be “accepted” or “rejected” by the recipient jurisdiction 
(or, less binarily, whether it will cause “irritation,” and in what form).40 The 
premise for this question is that, just like a transplanted organ or plant, the 
viability of transplanted law critically depends on the characteristics of the 
new environment. 
ICL, however, goes beyond prompting transfers of legal institutions 
rooted in a given jurisdiction to different contexts. Its standards are often 
new, disembedded, and explicitly designed for worldwide adoption. ICL 
standards conceived in abstract form and detached from concrete 
institutional contexts are best characterized as legal implants of new and 
artificial legal frameworks rather than transplants of real laws governing a 
given jurisdiction.  
Just like a prosthetic implant may imitate a natural organ, ICL standards 
often draw inspiration from existing laws of certain jurisdictions (especially 
the United States and the United Kingdom). There is no necessary 
equivalence between ICL and national corporate laws, however. The 
promotion of independent board membership by the OECD followed a 
similar trend in US corporate governance, but the definition of 
independence that the OECD embraced and then spread around the world 
differed from its US counterpart.41 Perhaps more importantly, several ICL 
 
37. For the classic defenses and critiques of legal transplants in comparative scholarship, see 
ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW (1974); O. Kahn-Freund, 
On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1974); Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility 
of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMPAR. L. 111 (1997). For examples of works 
relying on the concept in the CCG context, see MILHAUPT & PISTOR, supra note 3, at 209 (describing 
legal transplants as potentially providing a “‘market-tested’ product to local consumers of law”); Martin 
Gelter & Geneviève Helleringer, Opportunity Makes a Thief: Corporate Opportunities as Legal 
Transplant and Convergence in Corporate Law, 15 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 92 (2018). 
38. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015). 
39. See Legrand, supra note 37, at 111. 
40. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 37, at 6 (comparing a legal transfer to a kidney transplant); 
Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998) (criticizing legal transplants as a misleading metaphor for 
suggesting the narrow alternatives of repulsion or integration); see also Legrand, supra note 37, at 114 
(arguing that law cannot possibly travel given the cultural, epistemological, and historical baggage of 
legal institutions).  
41. See infra notes 117–120 and accompanying text. 











concepts—including ESG, human rights policies, climate change 
disclosure, and control of opaque subsidiaries—were first constructed at the 
international level before spreading across different countries around the 
world. 42  Despite traces of it, ICL goes beyond the international 
intermediation of legal transplants.  
Legal transplants are often used as a synonym for legal borrowing, which 
implies voluntary adoption by the host country.43 Yet the acceptance of ICL 
implants is not always the result of spontaneous choice by recipient 
jurisdictions—the prevailing view in CCG scholarship—but rather the 
product of different forms of pressure and nudges at the international level. 
ICL legal implants are soft and consciously designed to travel in a way that 
CCG legal transplants are not. Their development is subject to inputs from 
a different and potentially broader set of players compared to domestic 
lawmaking in a single jurisdiction. Nevertheless, legal implants may still 
lead to rejection or irritation in the host country or be largely ineffectual in 
achieving the goals of ICL lawmakers, as will be discussed further below.  
Figure 1 summarizes the key distinctions between CCG and ICL and 
shows that a comparative focus based exclusively on different national laws 
is no longer justified. It is true that, like all legal developments, ICL is not 
made from scratch; some of its components—such as the World Bank’s 
Doing Business rankings and the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance—borrow heavily from existing corporate legal regimes, 
especially from the United States. 44  Nonetheless, ICL is not entirely a 
product of legal transplants. Nor is it simply a result of harmonization 
strategies based on the “lowest common denominator” across different 
jurisdictions or of new synthetic solutions representing a compromise 
approach among various legal systems following comparative law 
research. 45  As discussed below, it has also been the source of legal 
innovations, such as the concept of ESG factors, human rights policies, and 
the discouragement of complex and opaque structures within corporate 
groups. In fact, given that ESG initiatives originate from international 
 
42. See infra Part II. 
43. See, e.g., Alan Watson, The Birth of Legal Transplants, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 605, 
607 (2013) (attributing the prevalence of legal transplants to the fact that “[b]orrowing is much easier 
than thinking” and therefore “saves time and effort”). It is, however, well-known that legal transplants 
can also result from the brute force of conquest or colonization. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina 
Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 165, 180–81 (2003).  
44. This has led to routine accusations of bias in the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings and 
traditional critiques of legal transplants as failing to account for the particular needs and institutional 
complements of recipient jurisdictions. 
45. See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 
50 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 97, 129 (2002) (discussing the shortcomings of harmonization efforts based on 













efforts and are not rooted in US law, US regulators currently resent 
international pressure for the adoption of ESG disclosure, to cite just one 
conspicuous example.46 
Figure 1. Differences between CCG and ICL 
 CCG ICL 




Legal implants  
Purpose of legal 
change  
Domestic welfare  Global welfare  
Reason for legal 
change  
National objectives International pressure  
Source of legal rules State law and private 
contracting  
International standards 
Main players State courts, 




standard setters  




D. EU Corporate Law and ICL  
The European Union has been greatly involved in the regulation of 
corporate law over the last several decades, viewing it as a cornerstone of 
the internal market.47 To the extent that EU law may be regarded as a special 
form of international law, ICL is extensive and robust in the EU context. I 
will not address ICL in the EU context both because of its distinct features 
(approaching a federal rather than a truly international system in some 
respects) and because EU corporate law is the subject of a robust literature. 
Nevertheless, the vast body of EU corporate law confirms the strong push 
for corporate law coordination in the face of economic integration. At the 
same time, EU law has also demonstrated the limits of ICL in overcoming 
strong nationalistic opposition to liberalizing reforms, as illustrated by the 
 
46. A former US official has urged American financial regulators to develop a foreign policy to 
prevent the domestic regulatory agenda from being hijacked by international institutions at the expense 
of US interests. Eric Pan, Senior Rsch. Fellow & Adjunct Professor of L., Presentation at Columbia Law 
School: Financial Regulators Need a Foreign Policy (Nov. 19, 2019) (citing the rise of ESG disclosure 
despite US SEC resistance as an example).  
47. See Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence and Varieties of 
Capitalism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 347 
(Harwell Wells ed., 2018) (“Throughout all periods [since the 1960s], EU company law harmonization 
was largely a top-down, technocratic project that was considered imperative to realize the common 
market.”). 











failure of the Takeover Directive in overcoming corporate law barriers to 
the cross-border market for corporate control. 48  Ironically, the harder 
character of EU law, whose directives are binding on member-countries, 
may have contributed to reduce its scope and development compared to the 
nimbler nature of ICL.  
II. THE RISE OF ICL THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
The birth of ICL can be traced to the East Asian crisis in the late 1990s. 
This serious financial crisis involving the “Asian tigers” took the world by 
surprise, exposing new fragilities in global markets and imposing hefty 
losses on international investors.49 While the causes of the East Asian crisis 
are contested, one influential view attributed it to the flawed institutional 
fundamentals—including corporate governance—of the affected 
jurisdictions, leading to growing international pressure for reforms.50  
This section portrays the emergence of ICL in various international 
organizations. The measures described are merely illustrative, not 
exhaustive. The goal is not to provide a precise mapping of all initiatives 
and networks and the different responses they prompted in various 
jurisdictions. Rather, the aim is to provide a glimpse of the scope and 
operation of ICL initiatives and their influence on corporate governance 
developments. Figure 2 in the appendix offers a graphical representation of 
the networked operation of ICL by international organizations and standard 
setters. Nevertheless, the influence of international pressures on domestic 
corporate law reforms is broader still.  
A. IMF  
An immediate consequence of the Asian financial crisis was to prompt 
financial support by the IMF, which required numerous reforms in return 
for its funding. These conditionalities spanned various macroeconomic and 
monetary policies, financial regulations, and labor laws.51 The inclusion of 
corporate governance among IMF conditionalities during the Asian crisis 
marks the birth of ICL. This section will focus on the IMF agreement with 
South Korea, a paradigmatic context for the broad scope of the new policy 
 
48. For an analysis, see Pargendler, The Grip of Nationalism, supra note 18, at 555–57. 
49. Stanley Fischer, In Defense of the IMF: Specialized Tools for a Specialized Task, 77 FOREIGN 
AFFS. 103, 106 (1998). 
50. Jack Glen & Ajit Singh, Corporate Governance, Competition, and Finance: Re-Thinking 
Lessons from the Asian Crisis, 31 E. ECON. J. 219, 220 (2005) (criticizing what they term the 
“Greenspan-Summers-IMF” view that the cause of the crisis was “the Asian way of doing business and 
the institutional structures that supported that kind of business culture”).  












interventions in a country that had a successful history of economic 
development. The core of South Korea’s IMF Memorandum concerned, in 
its own words, “the government’s policies to reform labor markets, 
restructure the corporate sector, and improve corporate governance.”52 
Overcoming domestic capture and mitigating interjurisdictional 
externalities appeared to have motivated the IMF’s intervention. The IMF’s 
role aimed to restrain the influence of powerful South Korean business 
groups (chaebols) on the political process to the detriment of foreign 
investors’ interests. This can be interpreted as an attempt to mitigate the grip 
of nationalism on corporate law by opening the market for foreign investors 
and deterring future nationalistic backlash. In addition, there was a 
presumed connection between corporate governance practices and systemic 
risk. An influential academic study argued that low investor protection was 
a key cause of the crisis in encouraging greater expropriation during 
downturns, which in turn prompted foreign and domestic investors to 
withdraw from assets in domestic currency.53 
Among the panoply of investor-friendly reforms proposed by the IMF—
which notably included the facilitation of foreign takeovers54—South Korea 
amended its commercial law to impose a requirement of a majority (or, for 
certain smaller entities, one quarter) of independent directors in public 
companies and certain financial institutions.55 Although pressure in South 
Korea for corporate governance changes was mounting prior to the crisis,56 
South Korean scholars uniformly describe the involvement of the IMF and 
the World Bank as “consequential” in prompting the changes.57 While the 
initial thrust for corporate governance reform came from the IMF, the World 
Bank became increasingly involved in connection with its technical 
assistance loan, hence illustrating the coordinated and networked operation 
 
52. Letter of Intent of the Government of Korea to the IMF (Feb. 7, 1998), https://www.imf.org/e 
xternal/np/loi/020798.htm [https://perma.cc/52Q4-DUVP] (describing “the policies that Korea intends 
to implement in the context of its request for financial support from the IMF”) (emphasis added).  
53. Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, Corporate Governance in 
the Asian Financial Crisis, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 141 (2000).  
54. The panoply of proposed reforms included the preparation of financial statements of listed 
firms in accordance with international standards, the reduction in the use of mutual guarantees by 
affiliates and subsidiaries, the requirement that listed companies on the Korea Stock Exchange have at 
least one outside director, the removal of the restrictions in the voting rights of institutional investors in 
public companies, strengthening minority shareholder rights by reducing applicable thresholds, 
eliminating mandatory tender offer requirements, and permitting foreign takeovers of non-strategic 
Korean firms without governmental approval. See Letter of Intent, supra note 52 and accompanying 
text. 
55. Kyung-Hoon Chun, Korea’s Mandatory Independent Directors: Expected and Unexpected 
Roles, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA 177 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald Baum & Luke Nottage eds., 
2017); Hwa-Jin Kim, Living with the IMF: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and Regulation 
of Financial Institutions in Korea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 61 (1999). 
56. Chun, supra note 55, at 189.  
57. Kim, supra note 55, at 62. 











of ICL across different international organizations.58 Starting in 1999, the 
executive boards of the IMF and the World Bank have engaged in 
“conditionality-sharing.”59 
The South Korean experience shows that some signs of corporate 
governance convergence, such as the embrace of independent directors and 
enhanced investor protection, are not entirely voluntary, but can result from 
pressure by international organizations. The IMF conditionalities imposed 
in the context of financial bailouts can hardly be characterized as purely 
“market” mechanisms, as they are occasionally described. 60  Some 
economists have argued that the role of IMF bailouts in foreign crises in fact 
increases moral hazard by muting the operation of market sanctions and 
incentives.61  
The influence of ICL in prompting legal reforms in South Korea does 
not mean that it was fully effective in achieving economic liberalization and 
corporate governance convergence. There is evidence that the independent 
director mechanism in South Korea works differently from its foreign 
counterparts, based on the widespread appointment of former government 
officials to serve as lobbyists in circumvention of South Korea’s 
anticorruption laws. 62  Moreover, while the IMF-sponsored changes 
decreased foreign ownership restrictions and led to a surge of foreign 
investment in South Korean-listed firms, subsequent domestic reforms have 
sought to discourage foreign investors from influencing corporate policies.63 
Chaebols continue to dominate the South Korean landscapes, and give rise 
to international charges of state favoritism to the detriment of international 
investors. An illustrative example is the recent investment arbitration claim 
 
58. The last version of the Letter of Intent between Korea and the IMF contains several references 
to the World Bank in connection with its corporate governance reforms. Letter of Intent of the 
Government of Korea to the IMF (July 12, 2000), https://www.imf.org/external/NP/LOI/2000/kor/01/IN 
DEX.HTM [https://perma.cc/DAC4-H9NM].  
59. Susanne Soederberg, The Promotion of ‘Anglo-American’ Corporate Governance in the 
South: Who Benefits from the New International Standard?, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 7, 13 (2003). 
60. Kim, supra note 55, at 63 (“The involvement of international lending agencies in the 
industrial restructuring process of the Korean economy has subjected Korean firms and banks to the 
harsh, but fair, discipline of international financial markets.”). 
61. See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, The IMF’s Imprudent Role as Lender of Last Resort, 17 
CATO J. 275, 286 (1998) (arguing that the bailouts create moral hazard by insulating foreign creditors 
from losses and lending legitimacy to domestic bailouts, which are not counterweighted by ineffective 
conditionalities).  
62. Chun, supra note 55, at 207; Dan W. Puchniak & Kon Sik Kim, Varieties of Independent 
Directors in Asia: A Taxonomy, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA 116 (Dan W. Puchniak, Harald 
Baum & Luke Nottage eds., 2017).  
63. Kon Sik Kim, Dynamics of Shareholder Power in Korea, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
SHAREHOLDER POWER 539–40 (Jennifer G, Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015). For a critique of 
foreign legal plug-ins in South Korea that pay little attention to local culture, see Amir N. Licht, Legal 
Plug-Ins: Cultural Distance, Cross-Listing, and Corporate Governance Reform, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L 












launched by hedge fund Elliott Management against South Korea, which 
asserts improper government intervention in a corporate merger to favor “a 
domestic corporate chaebol family over an unpopular foreign investor.”64 
In what would be a lasting byproduct of the Asian crisis response, in 
1999 the IMF and the World Bank jointly launched the Report on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) with the goal of strengthening 
the international financial architecture by identifying institutional 
weaknesses that contribute to a country’s vulnerability.65 As one scholar put 
it, “[t]he ROSCs are novel in that they have not only expanded octopus-
style surveillance in the public sectors, they have also moved into the private 
spheres of emerging market economies.”66  
Corporate governance is one of the twelve areas of ROSC assessment of 
individual country practices that came to be benchmarked against the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance described below. The ROSC reports 
typically propose several specific legal changes in the area of corporate law 
to bolster investor protection and carefully assess the degree of 
implementation of prior recommendations.67 For instance, various ROSC 
assessments have specifically recommended countries to adopt stewardship 
codes, thus contributing to the startling diffusion of such codes worldwide.68  
B. OECD 
The Asian financial crisis also prompted the OECD to intervene in the 
formulation of best practices in corporate governance, though the 
organization had begun working in the field shortly before the eruption of 
 
64. Edward White & Kang Buseong, Elliott’s $718m Claim Against South Korea Poses Risk for 
Moon, FIN. TIMES (May 2, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/1a972668-6ca9-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681 
d. 
65. Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes, WORLD BANK, https://www.worldbank. 
org/en/programs/rosc [https://perma.cc/9XHX-VC88]. 
66. Soederberg, supra note 59, at 8.  
67. For instance, Brazil’s ROSC report for corporate governance in 2012 recommends (i) moving 
toward international standard board practices, (ii) raising listing standards for the traditional listing 
sector, (iii) targeting enforcement by increasing resources of the Securities Commission, (iv) updating 
various securities regulations, and (v) updating various rules on shareholder rights and related-party 
transactions in the corporations statute. WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS 
AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT: BRAZIL 5 (2012). 
68. See, e.g., id.; WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES 
(ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT: RUSSIAN FEDERATION (2013); WORLD 
BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
COUNTRY ASSESSMENT: PAKISTAN (2018); WORLD BANK, REPORT ON THE OBSERVANCE OF 
STANDARDS AND CODES (ROSC): CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNTRY ASSESSMENT: MAURITIUS 
(2011). For a collection of studies documenting and analyzing the rise of stewardship codes around the 
world, see GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER STEWARDSHIP: COMPLEXITIES, CHALLENGES AND POSSIBILITIES 
(Dionysia Katelouzou & Dan W. Puchniak eds., forthcoming). See also Dan W. Puchniak, The False 
Hope of Stewardship in the Context of Controlling Shareholders: Making Sense Out of the Global 
Transfer of a Legal Misfit, AM. J. COMP. L. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with the author). 











the crisis. A Business Sector Advisory Group led by US lawyer Ira Millstein 
presented a report to the OECD in 1998, following a call at the 1996 meeting 
of the Council at Ministerial level for the study of corporate governance.69 
The so-called Millstein report, which had a strong focus on self-regulation 
by the private sector, was influential in the design of the original OECD 
Principles promulgated one year later.70  
First published in 1999, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
followed an explicit call by the OECD Council at the Ministerial level for 
the OECD “to develop, in conjunction with national governments, other 
relevant international organisations and the private sector, a set of standards 
and guidelines in this field . . . .”71 The call by the OECD Council took place 
in a meeting marked by the recognition of the “growing interdependence of 
countries in the world economy” highlighted by the Asian financial crisis 
and the belief that “effective structural policies,” including corporate 
governance, are critical to the “smooth functioning of the global 
economy.” 72  The ministers “urged countries affected by the crisis to 
implement fully and expeditiously the recommended reforms agreed with 
the IMF, the World Bank and other relevant international institutions.”73 
Since their inception, the Principles have had a “tremendous impact on 
corporate governance legal reforms, especially in emerging economies, as 
well as on the contents of codes of corporate governance.”74 
The very formulation of the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance—self-described as “the first initiative by an inter-governmental 
organisation to develop the core elements of a good corporate governance 
regime”—was highly enmeshed in a network of international 
organizations.75 The Ad Hoc Task Force in charge of the principles included 
not only all member governments, but also four international organizations 
(the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Basel Committee, 
and IOSCO), the European Commission, and representatives from selected 
private sector organizations.76 As described by one senior OECD official, 
the major losses suffered by international investors in the context of the 
 
69. See IRA M. MILLSTEIN, MICHEL ALBERT, SIR ADRIAN CADBURY, ROBERT E. DENHAM, 
DIETER FEDDERSEN & NOBUO TATEISI, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: IMPROVING COMPETITIVENESS 
AND ACCESS TO CAPITAL IN GLOBAL MARKETS: A REPORT TO THE OECD BY THE BUSINESS SECTOR 
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70. Francesca Cuomo, Christine Mallin & Alessandro Zattoni, Corporate Governance Codes: A 
Review and Research Agenda, 24 CORP. GOV. 222, 225 (2015). 
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27-28 APRIL 1998 (1998).  
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74. Amir N. Licht, State Intervention in Corporate Governance: National Interest and Board 
Composition, 13 THEORETICAL INQ. LAW 597, 604 (2012). 
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Asian financial crisis were a key motivation for the principles.77 While IMF 
conditionalities are often perceived as coercive, the preface to the 1999 
OECD Principles emphasized their non-binding character, with their 
adoption being a matter for the “self-interest [of] countries and 
corporations” in a world of “highly mobile capital.”78  
The OECD Principles explicitly aimed to “assist Member and non-
member governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their 
countries . . . .”79 From the outset, the OECD’s goal was not only to promote 
best practices of corporate governance within its membership, but also to 
spread them to developing countries.80 The Principles focus on the agency 
problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control.”81  
Although the Principles note that “there is no single model of good 
corporate governance,”82 they favor Anglo-Saxon best practices, such as 
board independence, 83  and focus on protecting shareholders’ rights, 
including foreign shareholders.84 While the Principles mention the role of 
stakeholders in corporate governance, the relevant language is fairly 
constrained in providing that “the rights of stakeholders that are protected 
by law are respected” and permitting “performance-enhancing mechanisms 
for stakeholder participation.”85 In so proceeding, the OECD anticipates 
subsequent developments in ICL in conceptualizing stakeholder concerns 
as a means to enhance investment value.  
In 2002, the Council at the Ministerial level urged the OECD to 
“continue its successful co-operative programme with the World Bank to 
promote corporate governance reform efforts worldwide, using the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance as a benchmark.”86 It also called on the 
 
77. Response from Mats Isaksson of question posed during Blue Sky lunch at Columbia Law 
School on Dec. 4, 2019, following the presentation of the paper Ownership of the World’s Listed 
Companies by Mats Isaksson and Serdar Çelik. 
78. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., supra note 75, at 6. 
79. Id. at 9.  
80. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 27, at 143 (noting how the OECD Principles on Corporate 
Governance, as well as the Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, “are used to gauge public policy in 
developing countries and have become criteria taken into account in country assessments by the World 
Bank”). 
81. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., supra note 75, at 10. 
82. Id. at 6. 
83. Id. at 41 (“The board should be able to exercise objective judgement on corporate affairs 
independent, in particular, from management.”). For a description of the lasting obsession with 
independent directors and shareholder empowerment in the corporate governance movement, see 
Pargendler, Controlling Shareholders in the Twenty-First Century, supra note 14.  
84. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & DEV., supra note 75, at 17 (emphasis added). 
85. Id. at 18, 33 (emphasis added). 
86. OECD Council Meeting at Ministerial Level, 15-16 May 2002, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP. & 
DEV., https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecdcouncilatministeriallevel15-16may2002.htm [https://perma 
.cc/35P5-VNSD]. 











OECD to assess its Principles, which led to a broad consultation and a new 
version in 2004. 87  The foreword to the 2004 version of the Principles 
recounted their success in promoting reform in both OECD and non-OECD 
countries, their designation as one of twelve key standards for sound 
financial systems by the Financial Stability Forum, and their role in 
underpinning the corporate governance component of World Bank/IMF 
Reports and on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).88 The 
foreword also mentions for the first time the contribution of corporate 
governance to financial market stability.89  
The 2004 edition of the Principles innovates in several respects, 
including stronger shareholder rights, greater control of related-party 
transactions, and the more explicit recognition of the need for investor 
protection vis-à-vis controlling shareholders in addition to management. It 
also tweaks its section on the role of stakeholders to recognize protection to 
rights not only established by law, but also “through mutual agreements.”90 
Perhaps more revealingly, the new version no longer regards corporate 
governance as primarily a voluntary enterprise driven by the private sector, 
but increasingly emphasizes the role of regulatory authorities. To this effect, 
the Principles now open with a new section on “[e]nsuring the [b]asis for an 
[e]ffective [c]orporate [g]overnance [f]ramework,” calling for legal and 
regulatory requirements that aim at “overall economic performance” and are 
“consistent with the rule of law, transparent and enforceable.”91  
Following the global financial crisis of 2008, the OECD identified 
corporate governance weaknesses as one of its root causes. 92  A 2009 
report—discussed with non-member countries such as Brazil, China, India, 
and Russia—concludes that while there was no urgent need for revisions to 
the Principles, a key challenge was supporting their effective 
implementation—an effort to be conducted jointly with the Financial 
Stability Forum, the World Bank, and the Basel Committee based on peer 
review of country experiences. 93  Corporate governance was no longer 
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conceived as a mere matter of country or corporate self-interest,94 as the 
report emphasized the externalities of corporate failures.95  
The most recent 2015 version, now called the G20/OECD Principles of 
Corporate Governance, reflects the participation of all non-OECD G20 
countries on equal footing.96 Experts from other international organizations 
such as the Basel Committee, the Financial Stability Board, and the World 
Bank again “participated actively in the review.”97  The 2015 Principles 
explicitly note that “[i]nternational coordination is becoming increasingly 
relevant in corporate governance,” and call for greater cross-border 
regulatory cooperation.98  
The 2015 edition of the Principles also refers to the availability of 
beneficial ownership information to aid regulatory enforcement and the 
control of related-party transactions and insider trading.99 The Principles 
provide that information about beneficial owners should be “obtainable at 
least by regulatory and enforcement agencies and/or through the judicial 
process.”100 Secrecy as to beneficial ownership is a relevant dimension of 
the competition for corporate charters that negatively impacts the 
enforcement of foreign laws and regulations. While jurisdictions around the 
world are moving toward greater beneficial ownership disclosure, the 
United States has been a laggard in the area.101 
OECD influence on corporate governance is not limited to the Principles. 
In 2005, it also issued specific Guidelines on Corporate Governance of 
State-Owned Enterprises, which aim to address the distinct challenges of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) while being “fully compatible” with the 
OECD Principles. 102  While the SOE Guidelines focus on corporate 
governance of SOEs, they are not primarily concerned with the agency costs 
and investor protection considerations that were the primary motivation for 
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the 1999 Principles. Instead, their main goal is to mitigate the effects of state 
ownership on market competition.103  
Accordingly, the first guideline begins by enunciating that “[t]he legal 
and regulatory framework for state-owned enterprises should ensure a level-
playing field in markets where state-owned enterprises and private sector 
companies compete in order to avoid market distortions.”104 Marked by 
growing concern about the role of SOEs in distorting international market 
dynamics, the 2015 revisions to the Guidelines provide for more stringent 
corporate governance standards, including the requirement of disclosure 
and state funding of public policy objectives.105 Like other areas of ICL, the 
Guidelines focus on general principles without delving into much detail 
about particular practices, possibly as a result of the need to achieve political 
compromise among countries with different policy preferences. 106 
Nevertheless, for jurisdictions accustomed to significant levels of state 
intervention in SOE governance, the OECD Guidelines can be less anodyne 
than they first appear. For instance, the Guidelines recommend that the state 
reimburse SOEs for the cost of pursuing public policy objectives—a 
stringent regime compared to the international norm—and have inspired 
countries to adopt similar rules.107  
Corporate governance has been a key pillar of the OECD’s self-
described role as a standard setter and “house of best practices.” 108  In 
addition to its Principles and Guidelines, the OECD sponsors countless 
reports, regional roundtables, and country peer reviews to collect data and 
promote compliance.109 These events are influential at the country level. For 
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example, when Brazil’s Securities Commission (Comissão de Valores 
Mobiliários (CVM)) recently amended its regulations to lower the 
minimum ownership requirements for the filing of derivative lawsuits and 
the exercise of various other shareholder rights, it specifically mentions 
OECD support for reforms in the area.110  
One particularly effective channel for OECD influence on corporate 
lawmaking is the accession process for new members. The recent efforts by 
Colombia to secure OECD membership in 2020 illustrates this dynamic. 
The invitation to become a member of the OECD requires a review of the 
candidate country’s “[w]illingness and ability to implement substantive 
OECD legal instruments,” which include corporate governance.111 In its 
corporate governance assessment, the OECD described the “substantial 
reforms undertaken by the Colombian government during this process to 
strengthen its corporate governance framework, both for listed companies 
and state-owned enterprises.” 112  The various reforms included the 
enactment of a comprehensive corporate governance code (Codigo País), 
the implementation of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), 
a statutory reform that provides for greater regulatory authority to oversee 
financial conglomerates to address conflicted related-party transactions, and 
an overhaul to the institutions of SOE governance to limit political 
intervention and centralize the ownership function.113 The press review of 
the OECD’s formal membership invitation to Colombia praises the 
country’s “major reforms to align its legislation, policies and practices to 
OECD standards,” including in the area of corporate governance.114 
The OECD Principles helped spur the spread of corporate governance 
codes around the world. While corporate governance codes are a UK 
innovation tracing back to the Cadbury Code of 1992, the international 
diffusion of codes was slow, accelerating only after the OECD Principles 
and the ICGN Code of 1999 (which follows the OECD Principles).115 A 
review of the empirical evidence shows that the key recommendations of 
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codes issued by transnational organizations have been incorporated in 
national codes, with international organizations such as the OECD, the 
World Bank, and the IMF actively promoting and assessing the 
implementations of these codes around the globe.116  
In particular, the OECD Principles appeared to have played a crucial role 
in the observed convergence toward formal levels of shareholder 
protections worldwide. An empirical study by Dionysia Katelouzou and 
Mathias Siems found that reliance on independent directors, as proposed by 
the 2004 OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, is the element of 
corporate governance that spread most rapidly worldwide between 1990 and 
2013. 117  While there is widespread perception that the diffusion of 
independent directors was a legal transplant from the United States, the 
model of independent directors embraced by most jurisdictions differs from 
the US model in also requiring independence from controlling shareholders 
rather than solely from management.118 The reason appears to be that the 
global diffusion of independent directors was less a legal transplant from 
the United States than a legal implant from the 2004 OECD Principles. 
Following a 2003 change to the UK corporate governance code,119 the 2004 
version of the Principles provides that, depending on prevailing ownership 
patterns, “independence from controlling shareholders or another 
controlling body will need to be emphasized, in particular if the ex ante 
rights of minority shareholders are weak and opportunities to obtain redress 
are limited.”120 
C. World Bank  
Since the Asian financial crisis, the World Bank has also been a key 
player in the development of ICL through its active cooperation with the 
IMF and the OECD. As described in its 2000 report on Corporate 
Governance: A Framework for Implementation, corporate governance came 
to be viewed as “an essential foundation of the global financial architecture 
and central to the World Bank Group’s mission to fight poverty.”121 The 
report—“the outcome of a close working partnership between the public 
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and private sectors,” 122  as described in the foreword by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury—explicitly conceived of corporate governance as a mechanism of 
investor protection to mitigate the principal-agent problem stemming from 
the separation between ownership and control.123 The central reasoning was 
that investor protection promoted financial development and, consequently, 
economic development. The World Bank partnered with the OECD to 
broaden the impact of corporate governance beyond OECD countries, with 
the OECD Principles serving as a “starting point” but not “a reference 
point.”124  
While the report acknowledged the power of competition in bringing 
about desired convergence, it still deemed coordination to be necessary. In 
Cadbury’s words, while “[i]n the past these standards might have spread by 
a gradual process of economic osmosis,” “the pace of change today is such 
that to leave the raising of governance standards to natural forces might put 
areas of the world where funds could be put to best use at a competitive 
disadvantage in attracting them.” 125  The report specifically identifies 
“resistance from powerful interest groups” that would lose power from 
investor protection and leave firms vulnerable to foreign control as a key 
impediment to be overcome.126  
Concerns about domestic capture and the grip of nationalism on 
corporate law were the main driving forces behind the Bank’s corporate 
governance efforts and its skepticism on voluntary convergence to greater 
levels of investor protection. The Bank’s initial goal was not to create 
standards or codes, but to “marshal[] support for corporate governance 
reforms” according to the countries’ own initiatives.127 To this end, the 
Bank embarked on a highly networked strategy relying on cooperation from 
various international organizations, governments, and private sector 
participants. In June 1999, the World Bank and the OECD signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding based on the recognition that “corporate 
governance has emerged as an important focus of efforts by multilateral 
organisations to assist countries in improving financial architecture,” which 
could “benefit greatly from closer and more structured co-operation.”128 
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While the OECD Principles were viewed as a starting point, the goal was to 
“help countries identify specific issues and problems and develop their own 
programmes and institutions to strengthen corporate governance.”129 
The Global Corporate Governance Forum was a highly networked 
initiative involving regional development banks, international associations 
such as APEC and IASC, IOSCO, the IMF and the Commonwealth 
Association, private sector participants, and donor and developing 
countries.130 The Forum aimed, among other things, to “build a consensus 
in favor of appropriate policy, regulatory and institutional reforms,” 
“provide support for regulatory and private voluntary action,” and “promote 
institutional development and human capacity building in the associated 
fields of corporate governance.”131 It was an effort in thought leadership and 
human capital development in the field.  
The Memorandum of Understanding also contemplated the 
establishment of a Private Sector Advisory Group formed by a small group 
of “private sector international leaders,” aiming to “mobilise support among 
private sector players world-wide and carry weight with senior officials 
from the government/regulatory side.”132  The inaugural chairman of the 
Private Sector Advisory Group was US lawyer and corporate governance 
expert Ira Millstein.133 
The World Bank corporate law efforts also piggybacked on its 
conditionalities and its traditional efforts “supporting client countries in 
undertaking difficult structural changes requiring reforms of legal and 
regulatory structures.” 134  These include corporate governance measures 
such as establishing regulatory capacity in capital markets and 
strengthening the competence and independence of boards of directors.135 
The International Finance Corporation (IFC)—the private-sector support 
arm of the World Bank—also came to require corporate governance 
improvements in investee companies.136 
One successful initiative benefitting from World Bank support was the 
establishment of Brazil’s Novo Mercado—a premium listing segment on 
the São Paulo stock exchange that imposed higher standards of corporate 
governance than those required under Brazilian law. A main motivation for 
the creation of the Novo Mercado was the significant political resistance by 
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established companies to statutory reforms aimed at increasing investor 
protection. 137  The Novo Mercado arguably helped investors regain 
confidence in Brazil’s capital markets, with the vast majority of IPOs in the 
mid-2000s taking place in the segment.138  
As reported by a founder of the Novo Mercado initiative at the São Paulo 
Stock Exchange, “the comments and criticisms from representatives of the 
IFC/World Bank and the OECD attracted special attention” during the 
discussions preceding the segment, as they “not only conveyed criticisms 
from foreign institutional investors concerning Brazil’s regulatory 
environment, but they also supported the reform efforts by sharing relevant 
international experiences and furnishing a ‘best practices’ benchmark.”139 
The contributions of the World Bank (through the IFC and the IFC’s Global 
Corporate Governance Forum) and the OECD were deemed to be “key.”140 
The Forum’s Private Sector Advisory Group played an “essential” role in 
publicizing the Novo Mercado in the international press, as their “enormous 
prestige and economic clout helped advance the initiative.”141 The IFC’s 
heavy involvement in the formulation and launch of the Novo Mercado 
includes organizing meetings and roadshows with the Private Sector 
Advisory Group’s Investor Task Force (including TIAA-CREF, Capital 
International, and CalPERS, among others) and large Brazilian companies 
and sending letters to its listed company investees to encourage a Novo 
Mercado listing.142 
By the mid-2000s, corporate law would also make an appearance in the 
World Bank’s influential Doing Business reports.143 Launched in 2004, the 
Doing Business project builds on the academic literature on “law and 
finance,” which originally sought to measure legal investor protections 
across jurisdictions and to demonstrate their causal impact on financial 
development. 144  By ranking countries according to several variables 
affecting the ease of doing business (including business formation, labor 
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laws, and contract enforcement, among others), the Doing Business project 
aims both to promote legal reforms through benchmarking and to influence 
their design. It thus departs from earlier World Bank initiatives, which paid 
lip service to the importance of tailoring corporate governance to the 
circumstances of individual countries.145  
The Doing Business section on investor protection ranks countries based 
on the protections offered against related-party transactions in terms of 
transparency, liability of self-dealing, and shareholders’ ability to sue 
directors for misconduct. 146  The ranking is based on a hypothetical 
transaction between two companies controlled by the same shareholder.147 
Scholars have criticized the index for neglecting “normative complexity” in 
only valuing stringent controls on related-party transactions, neglecting that 
they may confer firm-level and macro-level efficiency benefits, especially 
in developing countries.148 The methodology is, however, noteworthy for 
taking concentrated ownership as the paradigm, since related-party 
transactions are deemed to be a more significant corporate governance 
problem in controlled companies.149 
The World Bank’s Doing Business ranking is highly influential in 
prompting reforms around the world. As described in the 2017 edition of 
the report, “[s]ince 2013, 54 economies introduced 63 legislative changes 
strengthening minority shareholder protections,” and “[t]wenty-two of these 
economies did so by introducing practices and requirements measured by 
the extent of shareholder governance index introduced in Doing Business 
2015.”150 Although the empirical evidence on the ranking’s effects on the 
Bank’s financing decisions are mixed,151 scholars overwhelmingly believe 
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that the desire to achieve high rankings—and, arguably, greater levels of 
foreign investment—has been a key motivation behind legal reforms.152  
India offers an illustrative example. Scholars have noted that the OECD 
and the World Bank have contributed to tighten the regime of related-party 
transactions in India, among other countries.153 While some critical reforms 
in the area date back to the Companies Act of 2013, Prime Minister Modi’s 
subsequent “Make in India” campaign explicitly turned to the World Bank’s 
Doing Business report to improve the country’s business environment.154 
Although the Indian government fell short of meeting its original goal to 
join the top 50 economies in the index, it still made substantial progress in 
soaring from 130 in 2016 to 63 in 2020.155 India ranked as high as fourth in 
the protection of minority investors in 2017 and ranked thirteenth as of 
2020.156 
The political push for improved Doing Business rankings should not 
imply that India blindly converged to international standards without 
domestic political opposition. A 2014 amendment to the Companies Act 
relaxed some of the most stringent controls on related-party transactions 
such as the requirement of 75% minority shareholder approval—
interestingly, under the rubric of improving the “ease of doing business.”157 
To this day, commentators warn against the continued use of the “ease of 
doing business” agenda by Indian companies in compromising earlier 
investor protection reforms and India’s Doing Business ranking.158  
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D. United Nations  
A key recent development in corporate law has been the resurgence of 
the debate over the purpose of the corporation and the consideration of 
stakeholders’ interests.159 A key focal point is the emergence of ESG factors 
in investment decisions, culminating in the “remarkable rise of ESG.”160 
While these factors are now salient and influential, less appreciated is the 
role of the United Nations (UN) in their rise. UN initiatives not only coined 
the concept of ESG, but also critically mobilized support for the spread and 
influence of ESG factors around the globe, in addition to the dissemination 
of a business and human rights agenda more broadly.  
The role of the UN in shaping corporate governance is even less 
appreciated than that of the Bretton Woods institutions and the OECD. The 
new convergence around ESG and human rights—with the critical support 
of the UN—brought about a greater stakeholder orientation that was 
unforeseen in the original debates about the impact of globalization on 
corporate governance. While the initial goals of the IMF, the OECD, and 
the World Bank were to improve investor protection and overcome 
nationalist pressure on corporate law, the UN’s chief concern from the 
outset was to mitigate the environmental, social, and human rights 
externalities of corporate activity. The very concept of sustainability also 
traces back to the UN-sponsored Brundtland Report from 1987.161 
In contrast to the market orientation of the Bretton Woods institutions 
and the OECD, the United Nations has historically adhered to a conspicuous 
“antibusiness prejudice” since the creation of the United Nations 
Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964.162  In the 
1970s, a coalition of developing countries known as the G-77 sought to 
realize a New International Economic Order based on a project of global 
reform and redistribution.163  The UN sought to enact binding rules on 
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transnational corporations known as the Draft Code of Conduct on 
Transnational Corporations.164 Faced with significant opposition, especially 
from the US, the initiative was formally abandoned decades later in 1992.165  
The current UN approach to corporate affairs traces back to Secretary-
General Kofi Annan’s 1999 speech to the World Economic Forum, in which 
he proposed that businesses and the UN initiate a “Global Compact,” calling 
on businesses to uphold human rights, labor, and environmental 
standards.166 Annan foresaw the risk that the international regulatory gap 
would produce backlash against globalization and the multilateral trade 
regime. He presciently warned that unless minimum standards came to 
prevail in global markets, the global economy would be “vulnerable to 
backlash from all the ‘isms’ of our post-cold-war world: protectionism; 
populism; nationalism; ethnic chauvinism; fanaticism; and terrorism.”167 In 
exchange for business support of UN values, Annan offered political 
support for free trade and open markets.168 
The Global Compact became operational in 2000 as a voluntary initiative 
engaging companies and civil society in promoting UN principles on human 
rights, labor, environment and, since 2004, anticorruption.169 Interestingly, 
the Global Compact initially faced significant resistance from civil society 
activist groups.170 Ralph Nader, a long-time advocate of corporate social 
responsibility, decried the Global Compact as a “misstep” reflecting “the 
United Nations cozying up to big business” in encouraging corporations to 
sign up to the compact and “bluewash” their images despite continued 
wrongdoing.171  
Nevertheless, the Kofi Annan-led corporate governance initiatives 
would be robust and influential. In 2003, the UN convened the first 
Institutional Investor Summit on Climate Risk to discuss the financial 
implications and economic effects of climate change.172 The Summit led to 
the creation of the Investor Network on Climate Risk—a politically active 
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group of seventy investors representing USD seven trillion in assets.173 
From the outset, the group’s call for action included pushing the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce the disclosure of 
climate-related financial risks.174 
In 2004, Kofi Annan wrote to the CEOs of fifty-five leading financial 
institutions to join a financial sector initiative within the Global Compact.175 
The resulting 2004 report—Who Cares Wins: Connecting Financial 
Markets to a Changing World—coined the concept and acronym of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors and promoted its 
diffusion.176 The choice of new terminology was intentional and designed 
to highlight how the different areas are interconnected. 177  Unlike the 
confrontational tone of previous corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives, which were assumed to be rooted in moral obligations and 
harmful to investment performance,178 the new ESG premise was one of 
alignment of interests: “[u]ltimately, successful investment depends on a 
vibrant economy, which depends on a healthy civil society, which is 
ultimately dependent on a sustainable planet.”179  
The ESG framework sought to mitigate externalities of corporate 
activities precisely by declining to treat them as externalities. Instead, the 
report appealed to the “clear self-interest” of investment markets in 
attending to ESG issues.180 The report addressed issues that could have a 
material impact on investment value, but used a broader definition of 
materiality to encompass longer time-horizons and intangible aspects of 
company value. 181  Although socially responsible investing (especially 
focused on divestitures) had a long history, the ESG framing helped 
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eliminate the traditional separation between socially responsible investment 
and mainstream investment.182 
In 2006, the UN Global Compact and the UNEP (United Nations 
Environment Programme) Finance Initiative launched the Principles of 
Responsible Investment (PRI) together with a group of the world’s largest 
institutional investors in sixteen countries.183 As described by Kofi Annan, 
“[t]hese Principles grew out of the understanding that while finance fuels 
the global economy, investment decision-making does not sufficiently 
reflect environmental, social and corporate governance considerations—or 
put another way, the tenets of sustainable development.”184 The PRI operate 
as a network of institutional investors committed to following the six 
principles based on the understanding that “environmental, social, and 
corporate governance (ESG) issues can affect the performance of 
investment portfolios.”185 There are currently more than 2,500 institutions 
as signatories with over USD ninety trillion in assets under management.186 
In 2018, the PRI introduced new requirements for signatories, including an 
investment policy and accountability mechanisms for implementation.187 
The corporate governance architecture promoted by Kofi Annan proved 
to be influential, both through voluntary commitments, the political and 
lawmaking process, and legal culture. The Who Cares Wins report 
envisioned a role for regulatory change regarding disclosure and 
accountability on ESG issues, even if the favored regulatory format was 
“flexible” rather than “prescriptive.”188 The Investor Network on Climate 
Risk was “instrumental” in petitioning the US SEC to enact its guidance on 
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climate change disclosure in 2010 by identifying three existing items in 
Regulation S-K that could require disclosure relating to climate change.189  
In addition to promoting regulatory reforms, UN institutions have also 
pushed for broader interpretation of existing law to accommodate the 
pursuit of ESG issues. In 2004, the PRI, the UNEP Finance Initiative 
(UNEP FI), and UN partners identified the misinterpretation of fiduciary 
duties of asset managers as a key obstacle to the ESG agenda.190 In 2005, 
the Asset Management Working Group of UNEP FI commissioned a report 
from the law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer on whether legal systems 
around the world constrained asset managers from attending to ESG 
considerations in investment decisions. 191  The conclusion was that 
“decision-makers are required to have regard (at some level) to ESG 
considerations in every decision they make” given the “body of credible 
evidence demonstrating that such considerations often have a role to play in 
the proper analysis of investment value.”192 The Freshfields report came to 
be hailed as “[t]he single most effective document for promoting the 
integration of environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues into 
institutional investment” 193  and “its conclusions are nearly universally 
accepted by proponents of the SRI movement.”194  
In 2016, the PRI and UNEP FI launched a new project to “end the 
debate” on whether fiduciary duty is a legitimate barrier to the integration 
of ESG issues into investment practices and decision-making. 195  The 
resulting 2019 report declares that the fiduciary duties of investors require 
them to: (1) incorporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues 
into investment analysis and decision-making processes, consistent with 
their investment time horizons; (ii) encourage high standards of ESG 
performance in the companies or other entities in which they invest; (iii) 
understand and incorporate beneficiaries’ and savers’ sustainability-related 
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preferences, regardless of whether these preferences are financially 
material; (iv) support the stability and resilience of the financial system; and 
(v) report on how they have implemented these commitments.196  
The project’s initiatives resulted in the publication of a Global Statement 
on Investor Obligations and Duties with over one hundred signatories from 
fifty countries; roadmaps for the policy changes required to achieve full 
integration of ESG issues in eleven countries; and engagement with the 
European Commission and its High Level Expert Group on Sustainable 
Finance to help formulate a clarification to investor duties in the EU.197 The 
report celebrates how “[p]olicy and regulatory frameworks are changing to 
require ESG incorporation,” boasting that there are globally over 730 hard 
and soft law policy revisions across 500 policy instruments that support, 
encourage, or require concern for ESG issues.198 It warns that “[i]nvestors 
that fail to incorporate ESG issues are failing their fiduciary duties and are 
increasingly likely to be subject to legal challenge.”199  
The UN initiatives have played a role in the hardening of disclosure and 
consideration of ESG factors over time. The recitals of a 2014 European 
Union Directive requiring disclosure of nonfinancial information explicitly 
mentions the UN Global Compact and the UN “Protect, Respect and 
Remedy” Framework (discussed below) as possible references for 
companies. 200  New statutory requirements in the UK now explicitly 
recognize pension schemes’ duties to consider financially material ESG 
factors, including climate change.201 The new UK Stewardship Code has 
expanded the concept of stewardship to forcefully embrace ESG 
considerations, including explicitly climate change. 202  The 2019 EU 
Council regulation on sustainability-related disclosure specifically refers to 
the UN-supported PRI. 203  Meanwhile, various groups of institutional 
investors, many of which with UN affiliations, continue to push 
governments worldwide to strengthen their disclosure requirements on 
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climate change.204  The UN Global Compact has also sought to harness 
support from elite lawyers through the Guide for General Counsel on 
Corporate Sustainability.205 
The rise of ESG prompted by UN initiatives points to the growing 
pressure of ICL on US law, whose role has shifted from leader to laggard in 
this emerging dimension of corporate governance. The SEC has until now 
resisted enacting an ESG disclosure framework, though pressure continues 
to mount from investors and international organizations206—a topic that will 
be further explored in connection with the discussion of IOSCO below.  
Beyond ESG, the United Nations has also made great strides in the 
promotion of human rights considerations in corporate governance through 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, approved in 
final form in 2011.207 Although efforts in the area date back to the failed 
initiative of a draft Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations in the 
1970s, the immediate predecessor of the Guiding Principles was a treaty-
like document developed by a group of experts with significant input from 
the NGO sector called “Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights.”208 Aiming to be binding, the Norms imposed on companies the 
obligation to promote, respect, and protect human rights in their sphere of 
influence, but failed to secure approval by the UN Commission on Human 
Rights following significant opposition from governments and the corporate 
sector.209  
At the request of the Commission, Kofi Annan appointed a Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General—Harvard Kennedy School 
professor John Ruggie—to “identify and clarify” international standards 
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and policies in relation to business and human rights and propose “views 
and recommendations.”210 Ruggie described his appointment to “an unpaid 
position, lacking any independent authority, and initially with no budget or 
staff” as “soft power at its softest.” 211  Ruggie decided to abandon the 
binding program of the Norms, which he viewed as requiring a major 
overhaul of domestic corporate laws to replace the shareholder model that 
prevails in many jurisdictions in favor of a broad stakeholder model.212 
Instead, he decided to build a new “conceptual and normative 
foundation.”213 
Aware of “the (powerful) systemic constraints and (modest) 
opportunities identified in this literature [on global governance],”214 Ruggie 
echoed Kofi Annan’s Davos speech in framing the problem of business and 
human rights as resulting from “the governance gaps created by 
globalization—between the scope and impact of economic forces and 
actors, and the capacity of societies to manage their adverse 
consequences.” 215  Published in 2008, the resulting Ruggie Report was 
premised on three pillars: (i) the state’s duty to protect human rights; (ii) 
corporations’ responsibility to respect human rights; and (iii) access to 
remedy for human rights violations.216 
The rise of human rights in ICL did not go unnoticed by the US corporate 
governance establishment. In response to the Ruggie Report, the prominent 
New York law firm Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz released a 
memorandum to clients warning of the Report’s “significant, potentially 
harmful implications for global business and for meaningful accountability 
in various social actors’ duties to fulfill the promises of international human 
rights instruments,” thus requiring “close scrutiny by the business 
community.”217 Given the perceived risk that this criticism could unravel 
support for the Report, non-governmental organization Oxfam 
commissioned a pro bono response from the competing law firm of Weil, 
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Gotshal & Manges through its corporate governance partner Ira Millstein. 
The Weil memorandum argued that the Report did not create new legal 
duties, could benefit US firms by leveling the playing field, and reflected a 
sound business case for safeguarding human rights.218 It concluded that “the 
basic concepts embodied in the Report are sound and should be supported 
by the business community in the United States.”219  
The battle of legal memoranda between titans of US corporate 
governance highlighted the role of international law firms’ pro bono 
engagement in shaping ICL. Learning from the experience, Ruggie 
launched a new “Corporate Law Tools” project, which involved engaging 
more than twenty corporate law firms around the globe to examine how the 
corporate and securities laws of thirty-nine jurisdictions encourage or 
impede corporations’ respect for human rights. 220  The project not only 
helped inform elements of the Guiding Principles, but also operated to 
“draw the subject of corporate and securities laws more centrally into the 
business and human rights debate” and to engage the corporate law firm’s 
community and gather publicity and support for the project.221 The effort 
was highly successful. Wachtell Lipton came around and offered lavish 
praise of the final version of the Guiding Principles,222 while several law 
firms and the American Bar Association issued enthusiastic endorsements, 
together with the OECD, the European Commission, and the American 
Chamber of Commerce.223 
The Human Rights Council formally endorsed the Guiding Principles in 
2011. They provide that, in meeting their duty to protect, states should 
ensure that their corporate laws do not constrain, but enable business respect 
for human rights.224 As of 2020, the website of the Business & Human 
Rights Resource Centre included the human rights policies of over three 
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hundred and fifty companies worldwide.225 The Guiding Principles are now 
recurrently cited in US shareholder proposals and in company responses.226 
Nearly twenty percent of Standard & Poor’s fifteen hundred companies 
disclose human rights and environmental policies, despite the absence of 
such a requirement by any regulator or listing rules227—a finding which 
strongly suggests the influence of ICL. Moreover, UN initiatives on 
business and human rights have not ended. A legally binding instrument on 
the topic is currently under consideration, with the goal of requiring, among 
other things, that states impose liability on corporations for failing to 
prevent certain human rights violations caused by subsidiaries or 
contractual counterparties.228  
By working closely with corporations and institutional investors and 
promoting dedicated networks, the UN played an important role in 
promoting the new wave of “shareholder-driven stakeholderism.” 229  In 
2019, the Business Roundtable generated significant controversy by 
publishing a new statement affirming the commitment of US business 
corporations to various stakeholders beyond shareholders.230  While this 
development was hailed as groundbreaking, nearly forty percent of the 
companies subscribing to the Business Roundtable’s statement had 
previously committed to consider stakeholder interests under various UN-
sponsored initiatives such as the Global Compact, the Principles for 
Responsible Investment, or the Guiding Principles for Business and Human 
Rights.231  
On another front, since 2014, the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)—which has previously promoted 
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the celebrated Vienna Convention for the International Sale of Goods and a 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency—has come to focus on corporate 
law as well. Building on the experience of Colombian scholar and then-
UNCITRAL chairman Francisco Reyes Villamizar in implementing a new 
simplified corporation in Colombia, the initiative has focused on “the 
facilitation of simplified business incorporation and registration” to 
promote the formalization and financing of micro-businesses. 232  The 
relevant working group has begun examining a legislative guide tentatively 
called the “UNCITRAL Limited Liability Organization.”233  
Since then, Mr. Villamizar’s policy entrepreneurship has also helped 
promote the adoption of a Model Law on the Simplified Corporation by the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in 2017, which aims to extend “the 
benefits of incorporation to many small- and medium-sized business 
enterprises (MSMEs) without the complexity and cost that is frequently 
required under existing domestic legislation in the Americas.”234 The OAS 
initiative has since prompted reform efforts in Uruguay, Ecuador, and 
Peru.235 The OAS experience in company law harmonization followed the 
precedent of OHADA (Organisation pour L’Harmonisation en Afrique du 
Droit des Affaires), which in 1997 enacted a uniform law on business 
companies to preempt the national laws of all seventeen member states.236 
III. INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SETTERS IN CORPORATE LAW  
Formal international organizations constituted by international treaties 
do not have a monopoly in the formulation of ICL. Private standard setters 
also play an important role. This section will briefly summarize the 
contributions of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel), and the 
Financial Stability Board to the emerging field of ICL. The exposition that 
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follows is again merely illustrative. Other standard setters such as ISO, 
S&P, the Equator Principles, and the International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN) are also influential and highly intertwined with the ICL of 
international organizations.237 
A. International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) 
IOSCO is a non-profit organization constituted in 1983 to enhance 
coordination among securities regulators in North and South America.238 
Since then, IOSCO has witnessed an expansion of its membership and a 
transformation of its role from collaboration and coordination in the 
Americas to global standard setting.239 It now includes 95% of securities 
regulators worldwide, making it a “United Nations of securities 
regulation.”240  
In a pattern that should be familiar by now, IOSCO’s standard setting on 
corporate governance began in response to the Asian financial crisis.241 First 
published at the height of the crisis in 1998, the IOSCO Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation were revised in 2010 following the 
global financial crisis. 242  In shaping a public corporation’s disclosure 
obligations and governance structure, securities regulators contribute to 
corporate law from a functional perspective.243 IOSCO often serves as a 
source of inspiration and legitimacy for local regulatory changes, especially 
in developing countries.244 The controversy surrounding the strengthening 
of executive compensation disclosure in Brazil demonstrates this dynamic. 
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When Brazil’s Securities Commission (CVM) enacted broader 
disclosure requirements for executive compensation in 2009, an association 
of executives filed suit arguing that the new requirements were illegal and 
unconstitutional in view of fundamental rights to privacy and security.245 To 
justify the reasonableness of the requirements before the judiciary, CVM 
argued that the new disclosure rules represented an international 
commitment it had assumed before IOSCO.246 When the Federal Court of 
Appeals upheld the new regulation, it cited the “extreme relevance of 
credibility of capital markets, whose rules must be integrated with those 
already existing in the international market, it being implausible to permit 
that possible cultural differences justify the lack of transparency.”247 This is 
only one example of the influence of IOSCO standards, whose “ubiquity is 
impressive” around the world, in part due to the “power of persuasion of 
international financial institutions,” such as the IMF and the World Bank 
through their Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP).248  
While IOSCO’s influence on the expansion of executive compensation 
disclosure points to convergence toward Anglo-American investor 
protection, its more recent initiatives on ESG have generated tension with 
US regulators. Broader membership including Asian and other developing 
countries has shifted the balance of power and priorities at IOSCO.249 In 
early 2019, IOSCO issued a statement, without the participation of the US 
SEC, “setting out the importance for issuers of considering the inclusion of 
environmental, social and governance (ESG) matters when disclosing 
information material to investors’ decisions.”250  While US influence on 
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IOSCO in the 1990s was described in terms of “hegemonic coercion,”251 by 
the late 2010s it saw itself on the receiving end of international pressure. 
In her speech decrying the focus on ESG as “scarlet letters,” US SEC 
Commissioner Hester M. Pierce refers to efforts by the United Nations, the 
International Finance Corporation as part of the World Bank, and IOSCO 
in promoting ESG disclosure.252 US resentment of IOSCO pressure is not a 
novel phenomenon. In 2013, US SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher had 
decried the “coercive” nature of regulatory harmonization brought about by 
the G-20, the Financial Stability Board, and IOSCO.253 
B. Basel Committee  
The international accords on capital standards of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), 
comprised of representatives of the central banks and supervisory 
authorities initially from various significant jurisdictions, represent “one of 
the most successful international regulatory initiatives ever attempted.”254 
Although the Basel accords focus primarily on capital requirements, the 
Basel Committee also began issuing corporate governance standards 
following the Asian financial crisis. In 1999, the Basel Committee published 
its first corporate governance guidance, entitled Enhancing Corporate 
Governance for Banking Organisations. 255  It aimed to reinforce the 
importance of the recently published OECD principles and raise new issues, 
“in the belief that it will assist supervisors [worldwide] in promoting the 
adoption of sound corporate governance practices by banking organisations 
in their countries.”256 In its words, “sound corporate governance makes the 
work of supervisors infinitely easier.”257  
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Basel’s guidance on corporate governance has been revised in 2006 
(following the new OECD Principles of Corporate Governance),258 in 2010 
(following the global financial crisis), 259  and in 2015 (following the 
Financial Stability Board’s recommendations)260—each time to make the 
recommendations more detailed, encompassing, and prescriptive.261 From 
the outset, Basel’s guidance on corporate governance was designed to 
inspire regulators and banks in member and non-member states alike,262 
even to the point of contemplating “legal change.”263 Top international law 
firms have likewise covered changes in Basel’s corporate governance 
standards and recommended that their clients benchmark their practices 
against Basel principles.264  
Scholars of financial regulation have described a shift from an 
“assimilation” theory of bank governance, which assumed that banks should 
follow the same governance arrangements as non-financial firms to 
minimize agency costs, to a “bank exceptionalism” theory of bank 
governance, which posits that the systemic risk posed by banks warrants 
distinct governance arrangements. 265  Basel’s 1999 framework was a 
precursor in gradually moving away from bank assimilation to 
exceptionalism in corporate governance. It recognized that “[s]ound 
corporate governance considers the interests of all stakeholders, including 
depositors, whose interests may not always be recognised,” even as it 
conventionally described the board’s duty of loyalty as running “to the 
corporation and its shareholders.”266 Basel’s 1999 standards were impactful 
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as setting off a wave of financial-industry specific corporate governance 
codes in various countries in the following decades.267 
By 2015, the shift toward bank exceptionalism—or the retooling of 
corporate law to address systemic risk considerations—was complete. The 
latest Basel Guidelines specify that “[t]he primary objective of corporate 
governance should be safeguarding stakeholders’ interest in conformity 
with public interest on a sustainable basis,” and that “[a]mong stakeholders, 
particularly with respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be 
secondary to depositors’ interest.”268 It defines the duty of loyalty as “the 
duty of board members to act in good faith in the interests of the company,” 
no longer mentioning shareholders.269 It also provides that “[i]n discharging 
these responsibilities, the board should take into account the legitimate 
interests of depositors, shareholders and other relevant stakeholders.”270 
Beyond the board’s role and duties, Basel principles cover a number of 
corporate law matters, such as board structure, board committees, required 
disclosure, related-party transactions, the role of a chief risk officer, as well 
as special rules on the governance of group structures, including a unique 
focus—present since the 2006 guidelines but unparalleled in national 
laws—on discouraging complex and opaque structures that may hinder 
effective supervision.271 As previously noted, Basel’s corporate governance 
standards are now also influenced by the Financial Stability Board, of which 
Basel is a member and to which I now turn.  
C. Financial Stability Board 
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) is an international body that 
monitors and makes recommendations about the global financial system.272 
Like the Basel accords, concerns about national competitiveness and a level 
playing field provided a powerful impetus for the creation of the FSB in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis, a time in which the United States 
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faced significant political pressure for stricter regulatory standards.273 In 
this view, the FSB could help ensure that the new strictures did not place 
US banks at a competitive advantage in global markets.  
The G20 established the FSB in 2009 as a successor to the Financial 
Stability Forum (created by the G7 in 1999) with larger membership and a 
more solid organizational footing.274 Membership in the FSB is composed 
of standard setters such as IOSCO and the Basel Committee, central bankers 
and securities commissioners from G20 countries, as well as their finance 
ministers.275 In contemplating membership of the latter as representatives of 
elected politicians, the FSB has a strong political dimension that sets it apart 
from other international standard setters.276 
As Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner argued at the FSB’s inception,  
the basic strategy is a simple strategy. You get countries to agree to 
raise the standards, to commit to a level playing field, and then you 
have a huge interest in all countries in holding each other accountable 
to hold their institutions to that same standard, because they all know 
that if anybody tries to compete by lowering those standards, it would 
be adverse to their interests.277  
The FSB’s charter requires compliance with international financial standards 
by member jurisdictions; mechanisms of enforcement include both country 
reviews and thematic reviews. Moreover, since 2010, FSB members must 
also undergo periodic FSAP assessments by the IMF and World Bank as part 
of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC).278 
FSB has taken an interest in the corporate governance of financial 
institutions from the outset. Its FSB Principles for Sound Compensation 
Practices of 2009 directed the Basel Committee and IOSCO to “undertake 
all necessary measures to support and address prompt implementation of 
these standards.”279  Cooperation in this area was regarded as critical to 
avoid negative externalities of systemic risk and the risk that one-sided 
country reforms could lead to competitiveness concerns in the market for 
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managerial talent.280 The Principles covered the role of the board in aligning 
compensation with prudent risk taking and comprehensive disclosure to 
facilitate stakeholder engagement. The EU soon transformed the 
international standards into rigid and detailed prescriptions in its directives, 
while the United States retained a more flexible approach.281  
The FSB prioritized compensation as the object of its first thematic 
review. The recommendations range from improved disclosure related to 
governance arrangements and considering requiring shareholders to 
approve compensation policies and packages, to the adoption and disclosure 
of codes of ethics and conduct. 282  The thematic reports describe 
implementation failures and the various legal reforms by member countries 
to address the principles. The 2019 report, for instance, took stock of the 
new corporate governance and compensation structures required by the 
Brazilian Central Bank, the Bank of Italy, and the Bank of Russia.283 
In 2015, after being asked by the G20 to consider climate risk, the FSB 
created the industry-led Task Force on Climate Related Disclosures (TFCD) 
to develop recommendations on climate-change-related disclosure by 
companies.284 The TFCD recommendations, published in 2017, have been 
influential among companies, asset managers, and regulators worldwide, 
with most jurisdictions with the largest stock markets having responded 
with climate change disclosure initiatives. 285  The IMF and the United 
Nation’s special envoy for climate change and finance has urged the 
mandatory implementation of TCFD reporting standards, which have been 
influential across several jurisdictions.286 
D. International Agreements  
Finally, international economic agreements are also an emerging source 
of ICL. In 2019, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between 
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Japan and the European Union broke new ground by including an entire 
chapter on corporate governance.287 The corporate governance section of 
the EPA can be understood as an attempt to constrain the grip of nationalism 
on corporate law and the use of corporate law as stealth protectionism, a 
historical feature of Japanese corporate governance.288  The EPA covers 
topics such as shareholder rights, access to key information on the control 
or management of the company, board accountability and independence, 
and fair and transparent conditions for takeovers.289  
There are also various other sparse provisions touching on corporate 
governance in international agreements. Numerous agreements, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership and the European-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement, prohibit nationality restrictions for 
management, board, or director positions.290 There is an emerging trend of 
including corporate social responsibility provisions in international 
investment treaties.291 There is also a growing number of cases relying on 
international investment agreements to obtain redress for corporate 
governance abuses linked to state action.292  
IV. THE LIMITS OF ICL 
Because ICL has been largely unnoticed, the case for and against it has 
not received dedicated attention. Although one might assume predictable 
reactions from the analogous debates about the federalization of corporate 
law in the United States and the harmonization of corporate law in the EU,293 
the international dimension of ICL has some peculiarities that may affect 
the relevant tradeoffs. This section examines four potential shortcomings of 
ICL: (i) undoing regulatory diversity; (ii) challenging democracy and 
national policy autonomy; (iii) enforcement constraints; and (iv) political 
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capture at the domestic and international level. It then explores the prospects 
for ICL in view of the emerging signs of deglobalization. 
A. Undoing Regulatory Diversity 
If one borrows from the prevailing views in the United States and E.U. 
contexts, harmonization of corporate law would be unnecessary and 
harmful. Harmonization could be counterproductive in undermining the 
different benefits of multiple regulatory regimes in addressing 
heterogeneity, uncertainty, and political capture.  
First, companies in different industries or with different ownership 
structures might be best served by diverse corporate law rules. 
Harmonization could thus compromise this form of beneficial regulatory 
differentiation. Second, multiple regulatory regimes allow regulatory 
experimentation in the face of uncertainty about the effects of different 
rules, permitting states to fulfill the Brandeisian notion of “laboratories of 
democracy.” 294  Third, regulatory dualism permits states to circumvent 
political resistance to reforms by established elites.295 Finally, but no less 
important, the orthodox view assumes that the externalities of corporate 
activity can be effectively addressed through legal rules and regulations 
from other areas of law, such as environmental law, labor law, antitrust law, 
and the like.  
Harmonization therefore has significant costs if legal, economic, and 
political institutions differ across jurisdictions (as they clearly do), there is 
uncertainty about the optimal legal regime (which is certainly the case), or 
powerful interest groups exercise influence over the agenda (a common 
outcome). While all of these benefits of regulatory diversity count against 
harmonization efforts, there are two countervailing factors in ICL that 
potentially set it apart from the debate in national corporate law. First, by 
facilitating deviations, the softer nature of ICL permits greater 
experimentation, accommodation of firm and country heterogeneity, and 
mitigation of political resistance.296 Second, the argument for addressing 
externalities through other areas of law is weaker in view of the observed 
regulatory gaps in the international context.297  
On the other hand, soft law can easily harden or become sticky in 
deterring innovation or otherwise promoting harmful behavior. In the 
related context of international financial regulation, Roberta Romano has 
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argued that the Basel accord may have contributed to the global financial 
crisis in conferring favorable treatment on home mortgages—an 
international rule included to favor US domestic policies and appease its 
concerns about competitiveness.298 
B. Democracy and Nation-State Policy Autonomy 
ICL appears to incur in what Dani Rodrik has called the “trilemma” of 
globalization, which is the difficulty of simultaneously satisfying the ideals 
of deep economic integration, nation-state sovereignty, and democratic 
politics. 299  ICL lawmakers such as Basel, the OECD, and the United 
Nations have sought to increase the legitimacy of their standards through 
greater transparency and formal public consultations,300 though these do not 
necessarily undermine the critique of democratic deficit. On the other hand, 
it is worth recalling that, at least in the jurisdictions selling corporate 
charters to companies that operate extraterritorially, corporate law is the 
subject of a market dynamic driven by the interests of managers and 
shareholders, not by the political preferences of stakeholders.301  In this 
view, even if ICL is misguided in substituting bureaucratic fiat for market 
competition, it might be no less democratic than its market-based 
alternative.   
Another concern is that ICL unduly limits policy autonomy or 
supersedes nation-state sovereignty, a preoccupation voiced by US 
lawmakers in the context of financial regulation. 302  This has different 
dimensions. State-sovereignty may have non-instrumental value. Moreover, 
preserving local policy space may produce outcomes that are more suitable 
to the needs or preferences of any given jurisdiction compared to the “one-
size-fits-all” provisions of international standards. Here again, one could 
argue that the soft nature of much of ICL is an interesting antidote 
permitting greater experimentation and particularization to local 
circumstances typical of new governance theory,303 though ICL’s softness 
may prove illusory.  
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C. Enforcement Limitations  
If even “hard” international law faces significant enforcement 
constraints in view of state sovereignty, soft law—here defined broadly as 
“things that fall short of international law” 304 —faces even greater 
challenges to implementation. That ICL does not entail complete 
compliance with its vague standards is clear. The broad application of 
choice of law allows defiant jurisdictions disproportionate weight in 
frustrating ICL’s regulatory efforts. Even explicit IMF conditionalities, 
which according to some authors do not qualify as soft law, are often evaded 
in various ways.305 Yet one must avoid the nirvana fallacy of comparing an 
ideal domestic law subject to full enforcement to the actual ICL that is 
observed. There is little question that domestic corporate laws around the 
world face enforcement challenges to varying degrees.  
ICL does appear to influence state behavior to some extent. ICL is 
neither wholly inconsequential nor fully efficacious, falling somewhere in 
between. Soft law provides a focal point for policy convergence.306 Through 
a combination of reputational mechanisms, peer pressure, indicators, new 
ideas, and formal and informal constraints, ICL has helped move the needle 
in various corporate law reforms around the world. Soft ICL is often the 
catalyzer for hard domestic law.  
A particularly effective avenue for ICL influence has been through the 
role of international organizations as “coordination hubs” for certain private 
sector players. While this strategy has been interpreted as representing the 
capture of the United Nations by large corporations, a more charitable 
interpretation is that the UN has helped reduce transaction costs in finding 
solutions to collective action problems. In this positive light, when the UN 
promotes a meeting of asset managers and financial institutions to address 
the regulatory gap of globalization, it is reducing transaction costs for the 
organization of encompassing coalitions to promote public goods. The UN 
may have served as a transaction cost engineer in helping the collective 
organization of asset managers as “systematic stewards.”307  
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Nevertheless, the different drawbacks of ICL harmonization in 
disregarding local conditions may also lead jurisdictions to promote the 
phenomenon known as “faux convergence,”308 “creative compliance,”309 
“cosmetic compliance,”310 or “mock compliance.”311 The new frontrunners 
in adopting global standards of shareholder protection are Russia, China, 
and France, jurisdictions still not regarded as highly investor friendly, which 
strongly suggests a wedge between the standards “on the books” and “in 
action.”312 In attempting to tailor global norms to global needs and/or cater 
to local interest groups, formal convergence serves to mask persistence of 
existing institutions or even the increase of substantive divergence. The 
global spread of independent directors, a strategy promoted by different 
branches of ICL, arguably follows this trend. 
D. Political Capture at the Domestic and International Level  
ICL is not immune from interest group capture. On the one hand, 
powerful domestic interest groups may, indirectly through their home states 
or directly through the international lawmaking process, block reforms that 
are welfare enhancing. On the other hand, powerful states may shape the 
ICL agenda to favor the interests of their own citizens or elites to the 
detriment of global welfare. A former US Treasury Secretary has overtly 
defended the role of international financial institutions such as the IMF and 
the World Bank in promoting core US economic and commercial 
interests.313 This is the imperialist critique of ICL.  
ICL may also reflect capture not by the interests of countries as such, but 
by powerful interest groups within them. Scholars have posited that the 
interests of the large international accounting firms help explain 
convergence toward International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in 
the European Union as well as the persistence of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) in the United States.314 Interest groups that 
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cannot prevail domestically may nevertheless form successful coalitions at 
the international level. 315  The prestige and consulting opportunities 
associated with international harmonization initiatives may also help lure 
academics and practitioners alike.  
Still another concern is that ICL may embody a “corporate governance 
obsession,” with similar corporate governance prescriptions—such as 
director independence and shareholder rights—being offered as a solution 
to a vast array of social and economic problems.316 Corporate governance 
reform is uniquely appealing as a compromise solution between government 
regulation and unfettered markets.317 By offering a private sector solution 
without the need for prescriptive regulation, corporate governance is 
particularly palatable from a political perspective—but, precisely for this 
reason, it may be misused at the expense of potentially more effective 
solutions for the problem at hand.318  
E. Deglobalization and the Future of ICL 
ICL is, in essence, a response to the various economic, social, and 
environmental challenges posed by globalization. It emerged during the 
Asian crisis and gained force following the global financial crisis. There is, 
however, an apparent irony in documenting and scrutinizing ICL precisely 
in the early 2020s, when there are visible signs of deglobalization and 
growing nationalist backlash.319 Should we now expect to see the fall of ICL 
to follow its rapid and unexpected rise? 
For now, the fall of ICL does not appear to be imminent, and demand for 
it may even increase in the near future. The potential uses of corporate law 
to address externalities in view of government failures are now at the 
forefront of the debate worldwide. Lower levels of economic integration are 
unlikely to reduce major interjurisdictional externalities in the form of 
global systemic risk, climate change, and data governance. National 
governments’ hostility to international organizations may be 
counterweighted by a greater role of private standard setters and other 
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“minilateral” solutions.320  There may also be greater room for regional 
harmonization initiatives, which seem to be well under way in Asia.321 For 
good or bad, ICL may be increasingly called upon to deflect growing 
nationalist backlash against international firms and markets. 
CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR ICL 
Comparative corporate scholarship has assumed that any convergence 
among domestic legal systems would result from decentralized systems of 
competition in product markets, capital markets, and national laws. The 
premise was that corporate law models would travel, and the best models 
would win. Yet this view offers at best a partial understanding of the 
evolution of corporate law since the turn of the century. Some models 
travelled faster because of their active international promotion. 
Corporate law today is the product not only of the invisible hand of the 
market, but also of the visible soft (or not-so-soft) hand of international 
organizations and standard setters. ICL has been at once conspicuous and 
ignored, hiding in plain sight. Because the rise of ICL challenges 
conventional corporate theories, and the United States was initially 
impervious to its reach, it has been largely neglected and understudied to 
date.  
ICL is not monolithic, but fragmented, diverse, highly networked, and 
dynamic. Although the first ICL initiatives focused on the shareholder value 
model described by convergence theorists, more recent instruments have 
embraced a broader array of objectives, such as the reduction of systemic 
risk, the control of climate change, and the promotion of human rights. ICL 
has also gone beyond merely prescribing an Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance to also promoting legal innovations, including some 
disfavored by the US. 
Not all dimensions of corporate law are equally likely to be covered by 
international coordination efforts. ICL focuses primarily on dimensions of 
corporate law that may produce negative interjurisdictional externalities—
be they in the form of harm to foreign investors, global financial stability, 
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climate change, or human rights. It is therefore less likely to address 
potential components of corporate law that primarily affect domestic 
efficiency, equity, or competitiveness, such as the promotion of business 
groups or employee board representation. 
It is time to move beyond an exclusive comparative focus on legal 
transplants and to also examine international legal implants. This Essay’s 
aim is not to conclude the study of ICL, but to start it. Although the field is 
multifaceted and defies simplification, some things are clear. ICL has 
influenced domestic corporate lawmaking, but has not—and certainly 
should not and could not—produced full convergence. There is also 
potential promise for ICL to mitigate some of the most flagrant sources of 
externalities that distort chartering competition and national regulatory 
strategies, such as the obfuscation of beneficial ownership and the limited 
liability of parent companies for environmental degradation and human 
rights abuse.  
But exactly how much ICL should we have? And what form should it 
take? What should it cover? What implementation strategies are most 
influential? Is ICL driven by policy entrepreneurs, economic actors, or 
country interests? Does it favor the Global North or the Global South? Large 
or small jurisdictions? Capital importers or exporters? What are its 
implications for wealth creation and distribution? Why and when do 
jurisdictions resort to real or fake convergence? These are only some of the 
pertinent questions in the road ahead. 











Figure 2. Networks of International Corporate Law 
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